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Abstract: The article analyzes the influence of religious network structures on entrepreneurial success. Members of 
the religious community of the Bohras in Tanga, Tanzania are contrasted with entrepreneurs of other ethnic origins. It 
is shown that the religious network provides, through a loan scheme, the opportunities to start and run a business 
successfully. In this respect, the importance of the Islamic business ethic is underlined. Finally, the macro-economic 





The aim of the research was to analyze the positive and negative effects of social networks on the 
economic success of entrepreneurs and their enterprises, respectively. In the process of economic 
development I consider the entrepreneur as a central figure. The developed and developing 
countries in Europe, North America and Asia have shown that the entrepreneur is the agent of 
economic development. He is ‘embedded’ (Granovetter, 1985, 481) in social contexts. He may 
partly instrumentalize his belonging to an institution but, on the other side, his belonging may 
also turn to be a major constraint, both for himself and for his enterprise.  
 
This article focuses on the influence of the structures of a religious network on entrepreneurial 
success. I will try to answer two questions: a) which underlying social and economic structures 
make one group of entrepreneurs more successful than others, and b) which are the  macro-
economic effects of the described network. The examined group of entrepreneurs is the Bohras. 
They are a segment of the Asian population in East Africa.  
 
 
Research Methods and Sampling 
 
The criteria of including entrepreneurs in the sample were: they had to be of non-European origin, 
i.e. ‘Africans’, ‘Asians’ and ‘Arabs’. They had to be owners of an enterprise. Managers were only 
additionally interviewed. The minimum size of the enterprise was five employees in 1997. The 
enterprise had to be in the production or service sector. Questionnaires, structured and open 
interviews were used. Research was conducted during two stays in the Tanzanian coastal city of 
Tanga in May 1997 and from August to December 1997. 
 
First, I will briefly outline the historical and religious background of the Bohra community. 
Second, the Bohra entrepreneurs in the town of Tanga will be discussed. Based on interviews and 
the analysis of literature, the structures of their network economy will be interpreted. Third, 
quantitative analysis will be used to show that Bohra entrepreneurs are economically more 
successful than other entrepreneurs in the city. Fourth and last, the importance of the concerned 
network structures for the macro-economic level will be discussed. 
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Historical and Religious Background 
 
The split of the Shi’a after the death of the Prophet Mohammed was only the first of many 
schisms within the Shi’a. Questions concerning the succession of the Imam were the main reason. 
After the death of the sixth Imam (765), the Isma’ilis (7er Shi’a) split from the more orthodox 
Ithna’asharies (12er Shi’a). During the reign of the Fatimid Caliphate, again a schism occurred 
about the Imam`s succession (1094). The two Isma’ili groups of the Nizari Isma’ili and the 
Mustalian Isma’ili formed. After the destruction of the Fatimid Caliphate, the latter group was 
established in Yemen. Since 1167 the Mustalian from Yemen promoted the conversion of the 
population in Northwest India, namely in the Gujarat. The conversion was especially successful 
among the Bohras, a traditionally Hindu trading community.  
 
The head of this community is the Da’i-al-Mutluq1
 
. He represents the Imam in  seclusion and is 
for the Bohras the highest religious authority on earth. Moreover, for the Bohras he is also the 
highest authority in all social matters (Abdulhussein, 1995b, 238).  
However, the succession of the Da’i did not remain unquestioned. Repeatedly schisms occurred 
among the Bohras. With the growing importance of the Asian presence in the community - 
especially in economic affairs - the residence of the Da’i was transferred from Yemen to 
Ahmedabad in 1567. After the death of the 26th Da’i (1588) the community split into the Da’udi 
Bohras (living in Gujarat) and the Sulmanii Bohras (living in Yemen). From then on, both sects 
followed different lines of Da’is (Amiji, 1975, 28-33; Daftary, 1990, 257-61; Lokhandwalla, 
1955; 117-24). In the following, I refer only to the Da’udi Bohras because only followers of this 
group live in Tanga. The Da’udi Bohras are the largest group among all Bohras and their number 
world-wide is estimated between 0.5 Million (Daftary, 1990, 314) and 1 Million (Abdulhussein, 
1995a, 225).  
 
In history, the Bohra community suffered persecution. The Bohras often had to practise their 
religion secretly. Additionally, esoteric elements in their religion are the ground for estrangement 
from other Muslim religious groups. Both points are reasons for a kind of exclusiveness of the 
group and a tightly knit network among its members. This does not remain without influence on 
the economic development of the community.  
 
In the following, the terms ‘Bohras’ and ‘Bohra community’ are used for the Bohras in general, 
i.e. the world community. When I refer to the part of the Bohra community which lives in Tanga, 
I use the term ‘local community’.  
 
 
Bohras in East Africa 
 
Bohras were among the first Asian merchants who periodically made trading expeditions to East 
Africa. In order to coordinate their trade activities more efficiently, they established permanent 
                                                          
1 From now on I will refer to him as Da’i. 
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settlements in the East African coastal towns at the beginning of the 19th century. Famine in the 
Gujarat probably contributed to a considerable emigration process. The increasing importance of 
the Indian Ocean for the world economy and the shift of political interests of European states 
towards this region at the middle of the 19th century had a stimulating effect on the Bohra 
settlements. “Bohra settlements received great impetus in the middle of the nineteenth century as 
a result of the southward shift of economic interest in the Indian Ocean trade area, first with 
Omani Arabs and later by British, American and German merchants.” (Amiji, 1975, 35). The 
establishing of a British consulate in Zanzibar (1841) and the shift of the residence of the Sultan 
Seyyid Said from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1840 promoted the economic activities of the Asians 
through improved security: as British subjects the Asians had protection by the colonial 
authorities as well as by the Sultan who guaranteed religious freedom for Hindu and Shiite traders 
and financiers. The Sultan needed the financial capital of the Asians to extend and to consolidate 
his power in East Africa. After the establishing of a local Bohra community in Zanzibar as the 
entrepôt for East Africa, Bohras started to settle in all coastal towns - and among these was 
Tanga. Amiji (1975, 39) writes: “Most of the Bohras in Tanga came from Kathiawar. In 1875 Sir 
John Kirk noted twenty-two Bohra families and six Hindus in Tanga. The number of Bohras was 
much larger because each household consisted of wife and family while the Hindu lived alone.”  
 
An economic advantage for the Asian communities was that they settled in separate regions so 
that each region was economically dominated by one community. Through this separation of  
spheres, competition between the communities was avoided and made the exploitation of local 
monopolies possible.  
 
When the Arabic influence was pushed back during the German colonialism, the Germans were 
also dependent on the Asian merchants as middlemen to the African population. The Germans 
used the existing economic structures dominated by the Asians to establish and  extend their 
power in German-East-Africa. “During the German era, 1884-1918, Bohra businesses (...) acted 
as agents for leading German firms and missionaries.” (Amiji 1975, 39). After the end of the First 
World War the Asian emigration from Gujarat to East Africa stopped. Since the 1950s more and 
more Bohras have left East Africa. Especially after completing their studies in Great Britain, 
Canada and USA they settle there. Migration takes also place in East Africa. Bohras from Tanga, 
for instance, migrate to Arusha, Nairobi and Mombassa. The number of the Da’udi Bohras in East 
Africa is stated to be 15,000. Amiji refers to a census of the local communities in 1967 (1975, 
27). Daftary (1990, 314) speaks about 20,000 Bohras. The Tanga community consists today of 
about 300 families or about 1,350 people. This is equivalent to 1/3 of the Asian population of the 
city or about 0.5% of the total population. After Dar-es-Salaam, Mombassa and Nairobi, presently 
it is the fourth largest Bohra community in East Africa.  
 
 
Traders and Producers 
 
In the economy of Tanga, the businesses of the local community have an important role. It is 
noticeable at first glance that many shops are run by Bohras, since their clothing, the way of 
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hairdressing and other symbols indicate their belonging to the community. In fact, trade is the 
most common entrepreneurial activity among them but some are additionally active in the 
production sector. An etymological meaning of the word ‘Bohra’ comes from an old Gujarati 
meaning, i.e. to trade or trader (Daftary, 1990, 298). This explanation is also given by the Bohras 
in Tanga. Principally, within the Bohra community there exists a positive attitude toward 
entrepreneurship. Self-employment is regarded as a value and as an aim to achieve. Bohras strive 
to own a business, often a shop. Wage-employment is regarded as dependence on other (non-
Bohra) people. It is only accepted if the employer is a family member, or if one`s own business 
already exists and a wage-employment brings additional income.  
 
The present 52nd Da’i of the Bohra community, Sayyidna Muhammad Burhanuddin, who is 
residing in Mumbai, exercises intensive influence on the entrepreneurial activities of the 
communities` members. He emphasizes an Islamic business ethic whose essence is in rejecting 
interests and in supporting communal loan schemes. Because of this rejection of interests, the 
Bohras refrain from taking bank loans. An alternative to loans provided by banks are loans from 
the religious community itself.  These loans are interest-free (Abdulhussein, 1995b, 237). Those 
who take them have to follow the strict social obligations of the community.  
 
 
The Institutionalized Loan Scheme  
 
According to non-Bohra, the economic success of the Bohra entrepreneurs is due to the 
possibility to receive interest-free loans from their community. The decision whether an applicant 
will receive a loan or not depends on two community committees. One committee deals with 
loans below 1 million Tanzanian Shillings (about 1,500 USD in 1997), the other with sums above 
1 million Tanzanian Shillings. The borrower has to meet certain conditions in order to receive the 
loan. He has to prove his trustworthiness, i.e. two bailsmen have to sign the application form and 
to deposit a cheque with the committee (every community member can only be a bailsman for 
two other members). The borrower must have an account at the committee in which he has 
deposited half of his previous yearly profits. Finally, he has to announce the reason for what 
purpose he will use the loan. The committees provide loans preferably for launching a new 
business. For the enlargement of an already established company, loans are rather difficult to 
obtain. It seems that in the present economic crisis of the country this loan scheme has reached its 
limits because the demand is high. 
 
The possibility to receive loans - provided that a bailsman is available - has advantages in trading. 
For instance, Bohras can obtain credits for business transactions in cities other than their own in 
case that a local community member functions as a bailsman. For the acquisition of products this 
bears advantage in competition with businessmen who do not operate within a similar national 
(and international) network.  
 
What are the sources of the funds? The yearly profits which are saved on accounts at the 
committee are the basis of the funding. Besides, there are voluntary payments to the community, 
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as well as religious payments (Amiji, 1975, 46). Additionally, the zakat as a tax on the profit has 
to be paid to the community.  The zakat is 2.5% of the yearly profit. The local representative of 
the Da’i, the Amil, collects the zakat from those families of the community which are running an 
enterprise. In case that the enterprise makes a loss, the Amil checks the business accounts and the 
owner does not have to pay the zakat. However, he is expected to give voluntary contributions to 
the community. It could be surmised that the Amil and the businessmen arrange lump sum 
payments since it is highly problematic to figure out the real profits. If community members 
refuse to pay the zakat, then the local community exercises pressure on those unwilling to pay 
(Amiji 1975, 45). Partly, the collected money is sent to the Da’i in Mumbai and is no more 
available for the community.  
 
The financial security system of the community covers also the private sphere. Financial 
assistance is provided for weddings; for the support of widows and orphans an extra fund exists. 
The Amil has a central position in this system because he has to decide on the necessity of a 
person or a family. During research it was not possible to get more information about the exact 
sources and usage of the funds. Community members are unwilling to talk about this matter 
because non-Bohras may misuse this information to spread rumours about the community. To 
sum up, it can be said that an extensive financial security system supports the local community 
members in private and business affairs. This system is based on deposits, tax payments and 
voluntary contributions. The system provides security in situations of individual hardships. 
 
 
Inside vs. Outside the Community   
 
Not every Bohra can take advantage of the described system. The most important precondition is 
to be a member of the local community. There are Bohras, however, who do not belong 
(anymore) to the local community. The described system is based on social control. The 
advantages are restricted to those Bohras who follow the Da’i `s rules and instructions. These 
include, beside religious matters, prescriptions concerning food, clothing  and hair-styling of men 
and women. This far-reaching regulation of life is not accepted by all Bohras. If members do not 
follow the rules strictly, a conflict with the community arises.  
 
The Da’i`s power is based on his religious authority and the structure of the community. The 
latter is an hierarchical autocracy with the Da’i at its top. In every major city with a Bohra 
community the Amil, who is chosen and sent by the Da’i, represents the Da’i`s interests. The 
Amil is in rank the highest local religious authority and is in close contact with the Da’i in 
Mumbai (Abdulhussein, 1995a, 225; Daftary, 1990, 298-99; Lokhandwalla, 1955, 127). The 
Da’i`s relatives periodically visit the local communities and on such occasions they collect the 
zakat. The hierarchic structure gives enormous power to the Da’i who can decide on the treatment 
of every community member. His most powerful instrument is the exclusion of community 
members. If the Da’i excommunicates a member, then all other Bohras have to stop social 
contacts with that person in order to avoid their own exclusion. This rule counts also for family 
members. The social boycott includes the refusal of religious performances by the Amil. Through 
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the refusal of a place at the community`s graveyard and through the refusal of religious 
ceremonies at weddings and burials by the Amil, a harsh psychological pressure is exercised on 
the socially ostracised person (Lokhandwalla 1955, 124-26). The excommunicated person has the 
possibility to ask the Da’i for pardon and to become a member of the community again.  
 
A conflict with the community also arises if a Bohra neglects his duties in business. In one 
recorded case, this internal for the community mechanism of sanctioning was instrumentalized by 
a  non-Bohra. The case was such that a Bohra had debts to pay to a Sunni businessman. Despite 
repeated requests to pay, the Bohra refused. Finally, the Sunni explained the case to the Amil. 
The latter forced the Bohra businessman to pay his debt.  
 
Nevertheless, not always does the social boycott - and the fear of it - achieve its aim. Despite the 
restrictions, Bohras leave the community and live with their families as outsiders. Daftary (1990, 
313) refers to conflicts in the community in India as tensions between traditionalists and 
reformers. The reformers strive for a limitation of the Da’i`s power but not for a reform that aims 
to change religious aspects. Those Bohras of East Africa who have studied in Europe or North 
America and who have lived most of their lives there return with ways of thinking which brings 
them into conflict with their communities in East Africa. Since the structures of the community 




From a total of 78 questionnaires, 13 were answered by Bohras. Their enterprises are represented 
in six branches. The production of food and soft drinks (restaurants are excluded) is a major 
branch and 4 of the interviewed Bohras work in this sector. They are represented also in the 
branches of chemicals, wood processing, printing and metal processing. They are absent in the 
construction, mining, textile and transport sectors. In order to compare the Bohras with other 
entrepreneurs, three groups are being differentiated. The first group includes the 13 Bohras. The 
second group is formed by ‘other Asians’ (Hindu, Sikh, Catholic, Sunni). This group includes 17 
people. In the third group there are 46 entrepreneurs of ‘African’ and ‘Arabic’ origin.  
 
It is also true for the Bohras that the better the education of the owner, the larger his enterprise is 
(regarding the number of employees). A conspicuously high number of the Bohras have 
graduated from European and North American universities. While 4 of 13 Bohras have a 





The question whether the Bohras are more successful than other entrepreneurs can be answered 
positively provided that the indicators ‘capacity utilisation’ and ‘change of invested capital’  are 
considered. 
 
This is a working paper. A similar text has been published as: 
Egbert, H. (1998), Entrepreneurial Advantages and Disadvantages of Belonging, GeoJournal, 46,(2), 129-134. 
 
In the period from 1992 to1997 the capacity utilisation of enterprises owned by Bohras is higher 
than of enterprises owned by other entrepreneurs. More than half of the Bohras say that their 
enterprises have a capacity utilisation more than 60% compared with a quarter of the ‘other 
Asians’ and only one tenth of the ‘African’/‘Arabic’ group reaches this level. 
 
Tab.1: Capacity Utilisation 1992 - 1997 
       Capacity Utilisation 1992 - 1996 
       
  Owner   n  < 40%  40%-60%    > 60% 
________________________________________________________________  
Bohra   13  3     3  7  
  
 Other Asians  17  8    7         2    
  
Africans, Arabs  43  15   18   10 
________________________________________________________________ 




A second indicator is the change of invested capital in the period 1992 to 1997. None of the 
interviewed Bohras said that his invested capital decreased but 11 out of 13 said that it increased. 
From the other groups about 70% give the same answer.  
 
Tab.2: Change of Invested Capital 1992 - 1997 
 
            n   Change of Invested Capital 1992 - 1997 
       
 Owner     decreased  constant increased 
________________________________________________________________  
Bohra   13  0     2     11     
  
Other Asians  17  0     5     12   
 
Africans, Arabs   46   5     8              33 
_______________________________________________________________ 




The Bohra announced that the source for the increase of invested capital was own capital, 
especially reinvested profits.  
 
This raises the question why they use a comparatively high percentage of their profits for 
reinvestment. Two reasons could be given: The first reason is that investment into interest-bound 
assets is forbidden by the Islamic business ethic. This makes it necessary for the Bohras to look 
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for alternative investment opportunities, one of them being reinvestment into one`s own 
company. The second reason is that half of the profits - if not reinvested - has to be saved in the 
account at the committee. Once the profits are put in the account, the entrepreneur has no free 
access to them because the committee may use them for providing loans. This makes it for a 
prospering businessman rather unattractive to put these profits under the committee`s control.  
 
Beside the higher reinvestment rate of profits, two more aspects indicate that Bohras prefer 
investment forms which limit the community`s access to their capital, at the same time being in 
accordance with the Islamic business ethic. The one is the comparatively high level of education. 
This implies a high investment in human capital, which is excluded from taxation but contributes, 
in the long run, again to the community`s prosperity: a well-educated entrepreneur will probably 
be a successful entrepreneur and will support the community with comparatively high payments. 
The second one is the high percentage of Bohra entrepreneurs who own a second and even a third 
enterprise. 7 of 13 Bohras own a second company in comparison to only 7 of 18 ‘other Asians’ 
and only 9 of 46 ‘African’/‘Arabic’ entrepreneurs. 
 
 
Starting Capital and Crisis Situations 
 
To be a successful entrepreneur means to be able to overcome difficult economic situations 
during the life period of a company. One of these situations is the foundation of an enterprise. 
The possibility to have initial capital is crucial. It can be said that in fact the Bohra entrepreneurs 
receive loans from their community for financing the founding period. An interest-free loan 
scheme has existed since the 1970s. All enterprises which were founded or taken over by the 
present owner after 1970 were examined. 37 entrepreneurs financed their starting capital partly 
through loans and 7 Bohras were among them. While none of the 30 other entrepreneurs took a 
loan from their religious communities, 2 from 7 Bohras did. This number seems to be rather low. 
In fact, Bohra enterprises have been existing for a long time (in one case 107 years). These 
enterprises need loans for expanding the company rather than initial capital. In open interviews 
two more Bohras said that they took community loans for the expansion of their businesses.  
 
Furthermore, it can be proved that the Bohra entrepreneurs receive community help in times of 
enterprise crises. In the period 1990 - 1995 more help was requested than in the years before. 9 
from 78 entrepreneurs said that they received help from outside the company during this period. 3 
of the 9 entrepreneurs were Bohras. While 2 of 3 took loans from their community, none of the 
other 6 entrepreneurs did. 
 
It can be summarised that, firstly, enterprises owned by a Bohra are more successful than those 
which belong to other entrepreneurs and, secondly, that Bohra entrepreneurs receive financial 
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The Excluded Bohras 
 
In Tanga there are Bohras who have been  excluded from the community, or who have decided of 
their own free will to leave the community. 11 from 13 Bohras reply that they attend the religious 
services regularly, that is daily or, at least, weekly. The other two people say that they attend 
services very rarely. On the question how often the interviewee participates in social activities 
organised by the religious community, 9 people reply with ‘often’ and 4 with ‘rarely’. These 4 
include the 2 persons who do not attend services. While 9 entrepreneurs are in close contact with 
the community, 2 are more estranged and 2 others are excluded from the community. 
 
In the following, I focus on those two entrepreneurs who are excluded from the community. Both 
have university diplomas from European or North American universities. In fact, both belong to a 
comparatively small group of entrepreneurs in the city which obtained such degrees. However, 
other Bohras have also similar degrees from American universities and they are not in a conflict 
with the local community. In contrast, their families strongly support the community. A good 
education alone cannot explain why Bohras leave their communities. 
 
What strikes the observer is that the enterprises of both of the excluded Bohras are among the 
three largest Bohra enterprises. An interpretation could be that with the increase of the size of the 
enterprise the dependence on the community shrinks. Education abroad has consequences: not 
only that European or American values are adopted by the people and  make a conflict with the 
community more probable, but also that the better education makes a successful establishment 
more probable. With the prospering of the company, the dependence on financial support by the 
community diminishes. Additionally, a stay abroad allows the establishing of business contacts 
outside the Bohra community. Thus, the independence of those Bohras studying abroad is 
obtained in several ways. 
 
These Bohras who were excluded and  partly excommunicated from the local community criticize 
neither the payment in general, nor the amount of money paid to the community, or to the Da’i, 
respectively. What is criticized is the lack of control, the undemocratic decision-making in the 
community and the uncontrolled usage of the money by the Da’i.  
 
 
The Importance of the Network for the Economy  
 
The religious network of the Bohra community has several positive effects on the development of 
entrepreneurship in Tanzania. Micro-economic advantages are based on exclusiveness, which  is 
maintained by an internal hierarchy. Economic disadvantages are observable on the macro level. 
The macro-economic advantages and disadvantages will now be summarised.  
 
The first advantage is the possibility to receive financial support in the founding phase of a 
business. Loans are provided with extremely favourable conditions. Through the loan scheme 
already established entrepreneurs support the founding of new enterprises. The establishing of 
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new enterprises creates employment opportunities dominantly for African workers. Thus, the 
macro-economic importance is the creation of jobs. 
 
A second advantage lies in the financial support for community members in situations of crises. 
Especially in times of economic recession loans from banks bear a high risk due to high interests. 
Such loans often bring the enterprise at the threshold of bankruptcy. Interest-free community 
loans can stabilize enterprises in a recession period and preserve working places. 
 
The third advantage is based on an Islamic business ethic. It supports investments in production 
and human capital, while investments in financial assets are not promoted. That is why profits are 
channelled into the first two forms of investment. For the Tanzanian economy both are essential 
for the future development. The country suffers deficit of well-educated entrepreneurs as well as a 
lack of investment in the production sector. 
 
The first disadvantage for the Tanzanian economy is that the market principle in respect of 
selecting unprofitable enterprises is displaced. Unprofitable (Bohra) companies can remain in the 
market while enterprises whose owners are not embedded in similar networks will have to close 
down. This refers dominantly to African enterprises. 
 
A second disadvantage is based on the exclusiveness of the community. It is possible to become a 
member only through birth or marriage. The economic advantages, thus, are restricted to a small 
minority of the population in the country. Due to its small size, the overall positive economic 
effects remain limited. Because of the (ethnic and religious) exclusiveness of the Bohra 
community, entrepreneurs of African origin do not consider the community a successful 
economic model which could be applied for their own ethnic groups.  
 
The third disadvantage is the formation of oligopolistic market structures. This refers rather to the 
Bohra traders than to the producers. Barriers for market entry are created for entrepreneurs who 
cannot compete with the Bohra. This makes it more difficult for entrepreneurs to establish in the 
market and limits the gains of the market to a small group. 
 
The fourth disadvantage is the capital export through transfers. A reinvestment of profits on a 
local or national scale - for social or business projects - would contribute to building the regional 
and national economy. The hierarchic structure of the community, however,  does not allow a 
local investment of the profits, this capital is transferred to the Da’i in Mumbai, instead. This 
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